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Summary 
This thesis attempts to answer the following research question: 
“To which degree, if any, does policy open to international trade lead to increased economic 
growth within a country?” 
The applied measure of openness to international trade is an index that increases as a country 
has less restrictions on trade, while annual growth in GDP per capita is the preferred measure 
of economic growth. There is a potential problem of endogeneity in the openness index, so 
four instrumental variables are suggested. These are the share of votes equal to the U.S. in the 
United Nations General Assembly, number of years as member of GATT/WTO, share of 
children that are immune to DPT and a country’s distance to equator. 
A panel data set for up to 91 countries for the time period 1970-2011 is analysed, with 
countries from all income-groups represented. First, openness is considered exogenous, and 
directly applied with both an ordinary least squares-estimator and a fixed effect-estimator. 
Second, the potential endogeneity bias is accounted for by use of instrumental variable 
regressions. 
The main results of this thesis are that there exists a negative relationship between openness to 
international trade and economic growth. The result is robust to alterations of model 
specification, and high-income countries have the largest reported negative effects of a ceteris 
paribus increase in openness. The instrumental variables remain strong throughout the 
robustness tests, and especially share of votes equal to the U.S. in the United Nations General 
Assembly, number of years as member of GATT/WTO are reported as valid.  
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Part 1 
1 Introduction 
 “[…] our peace and prosperity depend in the long run on the well-being of others.” (Landes, 
1999, p. xx) 
1.1 Motivation 
In his book “The Wealth and Poverty of Nations”, David Landes (1999) asks why some 
countries are so rich, while others are so poor. There is no single correct answer to a question 
of that magnitude, and finding answers is difficult, but that should not discourage us from 
conducting further research into the field. Together with climate change, poverty and lack of 
growth in certain regions is today perhaps the most important issue for the world community 
to tackle, increasingly relevant since it induces large flows of refugees and emigrants looking 
for a better life (United Nations, 2009). If we agree that shutting the borders and keeping the 
unfortunate “out” is a poor solution in the long run, the answer must be to improve living 
conditions in the developing countries of the world. Consequently, we need knowledge of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the possible remedies, and during the last decades, The World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other significant actors in the world 
economy have actively promoted increased international trade and liberal economic policy as 
drivers of economic growth. The mantra is that less tariffs and trade barriers lead to increased 
trade across borders, and that this induces growth and welfare in every country. Opponents of 
such changes are a diverse group, including for example labour unions, governments and 
interest groups. They may wish to protect important industries on domestic soil, they may 
believe that increased international trade is bad for the environment or they may simply 
oppose free trade on ideological grounds. 
1.2 Objective and research question 
There are different measures available, both regarding the degree of trade openness in a 
country, and its wealth. This thesis applies an index of openness that varies with tariff levels, 
capital controls, taxes on international trade and hidden import barriers. It is thus a measure of 
policy, capturing whether or not foreign suppliers face the same fees, taxes and obstacles as 
domestic suppliers, so that the market can differentiate between products on even grounds. 
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The index is increasing if the restrictions are decreasing1. The preferred measure of wealth is 
growth in expenditure-side GDP per capita in fixed 2005-US$, based on purchasing power 
parity (PPP)2. Henceforth, these measures will respectively be addressed as openness to trade 
and economic growth. 
The thesis has primarily two purposes. First, we hope that it can be a contribution to the field, 
and shed some additional light on the issue of trade policy and its impact on welfare. 
Endogeneity is a significant challenge, where the problem is that regressions indicate causal 
effects while variations in fact are only correlations. This thesis will utilize several 
instrumental variables to try and account for the endogeneity, and hence avoid spurious 
results. Related to this, the second purpose is that we hope to nuance the strong conclusions 
other researchers have come to, and highlight the many challenges that arise when attempting 
to seek causal effects in macroeconomic data. Consequently, the main research question of the 
thesis is: 
“To which degree, if any, does policy open to international trade lead to increased economic 
growth within a country?” 
 The research question may be analysed both within a quantitative and a qualitative 
framework. As the variables we seek to analyse are available in quantitative terms, we see it 
as natural to employ regression analysis as the main tool to answer the research question. If 
properly conducted, this will allow us to find causal relationships between welfare and 
openness to trade, if such a relationship indeed exists. However, a range of challenges may 
make it difficult coming to a firm conclusion, such as the mentioned endogeneity problem, 
and we will therefore also include a qualitative discussion of the topic. 
1.3 Structure 
This thesis consists of five parts. Part 2 provides an overview of the topic in question, 
including a quick look at the historical development, some previous research and a section 
summing up the theories providing a foundation for the analyses. In Part 3, quantitative 
methods are explained, and also their individual strengths and weaknesses. In addition, an 
overview of the data is provided, as well as justifications for the choice of variables. Part 4 
consists of an empirical analysis, seeking a causal relationship between trade policy and 
economic growth. Several tests related to the different methods are conducted and their 
                                                 
1 Please see appendix 1, table 3 for a detailed description of the elements in the index 
2 Data is taken from Penn World Table 8.1 
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consequences explained. Finally, Part 5 provides a qualitative discussion of the findings, as 
well as possible implications for international policy, before the thesis is concluded.  
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Part 2 
2 Background 
2.1 Historical Development 
Today, most people consider annual economic growth of at least one or two percent as the 
normal situation, and a year of negative growth is usually front-page news. Before the 
industrial revolution however, this would have been near unimaginable (Nye, 2008; The 
Maddison-Project, 2013). During the 17th and 18th century, mercantilism was the main 
paradigm, exports considered to be good and imports bad, naturally leading to import 
restrictions and export subsidies (Irwin D. A., 2001). During the years of The Industrial 
Revolution, influential writers strongly criticized such mercantilist practices, resulting in a 
downward pressure on trade restrictions. In fact, the greater part of the 19th century was later 
named “The first wave of globalization” (Nagdy & Roser, 2015). This was a period where 
trade increased heavily, from less than 10 percent of global GDP to nearly 40 percent. 
However, the outbreak of “The Great War” was followed by a period of protectionism and, 
some would say as a consequence, several economic crises. This had a severely cooling effect 
on global trade. After World War II, the world picked up the gauntlet where they had left it 
nearly 50 years earlier. After 1950, combined export and import as share of GDP has 
approximately tripled from about 20 percent to 60 percent today. This is definitely the period 
where the world has also 
progressed the fastest, with 
global GDP per capita today 
four times what it was some 
60 years ago. Moreover, 
“The second wave of 
globalization” has also been 
a period of openness to 
trade, especially during the 
last 30-40 years, as 
visualised in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 - Average level of openness 1970-2011 (Dreher, 2006) 
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Trade policy has been liberalized, both with regards to tariff rates and subtler trade restrictions 
such as import quotas. According to the World Bank (2002), the only two regions that on 
average have kept their tariff rates at relatively high levels are Africa and the Middle East, 
regions that have also seen less growth than most of the rest of the world. 
There are still large differences in how open countries are to trade, and on average high-
income countries are most open, while low-income countries have the lowest degree of 
openness (figure 2).  
 
INCOME GROUP AVERAGE OPENNESS 
HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES 0.65 
MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES 0.57 
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES 0.51 
Figure 2 - Average levels of openness for different income groups in 2011 (Dreher, 2006) 
  
10 
 
2.2 Empirical evidence 
2.2.1 Trade policy and growth 
When investigating previous research, a natural first step is to look at the results of Axel 
Dreher (2006) who constructed the openness index used in this thesis. The long time-period 
covered by the openness index is one of its strengths, but he admits that it may be endogenous 
in growth regressions. Dreher created what is called the KOF Globalization Index, consisting 
of social, political and economic globalization. The openness index employed in this thesis is 
one of two sub-indices together constituting economic globalization, the other being actual 
trade flows. When using a sub-index in a regression, the interaction between different forms 
of globalization should be controlled for. Dreher finds that the openness indicator has no 
statistically significant effect on economic growth. He argues that this could reflect the 
average of benefits from high developed countries with sound institutions and markets, 
combined with the cost of higher frequency of financial crisis in less developed countries. 
Garret (2001) suggests that capital account openness only promotes growth in high developed 
countries, and Dreher lends support to this claim, high income countries alone gaining 
significant positive effects of increased openness to trade. Still, interactions between different 
forms of liberalization may also have significant effects on less developed countries (Dreher, 
2006). 
A policy open to trade widens the list of possible trade partners and products, and one can 
assume that increased international trade is a given consequence. If this is correct, a 
possibility is to analyse whether or not trade increases economic growth, instead of finding a 
direct link between policy and growth. This is what Frankel & Romer (1999) tries in their 
paper “Does Trade Cause Growth?”. GDP and trade are endogenously connected, especially 
with regard to reverse causality bias, inducing spurious effects in direct regressions. In their 
article, they therefore try to estimate every individual country’s trade using instrument 
variables applied in a gravity equation. Their results indicate that the geographic 
characteristics of a country are good determinants of trade, and further that “natural openness” 
to trade has a positive impact on economic growth. However, individual variation in 
countries’ trade policies, the “residual openness”, is not included in the model and may have a 
different impact. They acknowledge this shortcoming, but maintain that their result suggests 
countries should pursue policies promoting international trade. 
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A different way to look at it is that there exists no simple relationship between trade barriers 
and growth, but rather that some “prerequisites” are needed. Characteristics such as 
comparative advantages in protected sectors, if we are looking at a developed or developing 
country or if it is big or small, all play their part in which effects trade policies have. Trade 
barriers may have gotten an unfair negative reputation after the failed export-subsidizing 
policies in Latin-America during the 80s and 90s, while the opposite is true for outward-
oriented policies. If that is correct, it may also be that the benefits of openness are oversold in 
modern publications by the IMF and the World Bank (Rodriguez & Rodrik, 2000; Yanikkaya, 
2003). Sound institutions overlooking the process might be imperative for a successful 
liberalization of trade policy. While many industrial countries might reap benefits from 
openness, as they are able to control the many aspects of their economy, other countries with 
more fragile and fragmented economies could have costs associated with openness. One such 
cost may be that open countries with bad institutions suffer greater losses associated with 
corruption (Wei, 2000). Consequently, open countries have greater incentive to develop good 
institutions, and countries already equipped with good institutions have greater incentive to 
open up. In addition, trade restrictions in a country should be transparent and uniform so that 
the market is as fair as possible. Without good institutions this is hard to sustain and 
corruption will often be an unwanted effect. 
Most research indicates a positive relationship between openness and economic growth 
(Harrison A., 1996; Winters L., 2004; Sala-I-Martin, 1997; Dollar, 1992). The vast literature 
indicates a consensus that there is in fact a linkage between the two, but the conclusions are 
not definitive. One issue is that not all previous research has sufficiently taken into account 
the potential endogeneity problems, and the many cross sectional analyses also omit important 
time varying aspects. Sceptics exist, but it seems even they acknowledge that openness has 
some effect on economic growth, just that it is not clear-cut: 
”Our bottom line is that the nature of the relationship between trade policy and economic 
growth remains very much an open question. The issue is far from having been settled on 
empirical grounds. We are in fact sceptical that there is a general, unambiguous relationship 
between trade openness and growth waiting to be discovered.” (Rodriguez & Rodrik, 2000) 
2.2.2 Measuring trade-policy 
When searching for links between trade-policy and economic growth, correct measures of 
openness is vital. By replicating four of the more cited and well-known papers within the area, 
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Rodriguez & Rodrik (2000) (RR) find discrepancies with most of the measures used as a 
proxy for trade-policy. Dollar (1992) constructs two indices, an “index of real exchange rate-
distortions” and an “index of real exchange rate-variability” which, he argues, have a 
relationship with outward-oriented policies. The degree of real exchange rate distortions is 
affected by how far from free-trade the country is. A relatively high price level is assumed as 
an indication that a country has high trade-barriers, but the index is very sensitive to which 
types of trade restrictions are applied. Additionally, monetary policy and transport costs affect 
the index in ambiguous ways, inducing biased results. The variability index, according to RR, 
is more a measure of instability than trade policy, and any possible linkage to growth would 
be spuriously connected to trade openness. 
Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner (1995) developed a measure of openness (SW) which has 
been used in several later papers. It defines a country as either open or closed based on several 
information criteria3 . The indicator seems to be robust, but the question is how good a 
measure of trade-policy it is. RR finds that the SW-indicator basically “[…] serves as a proxy 
for a wide range of policy and institutional differences, and that it yields an upward-biased 
estimate of the effects of trade restrictions.” Most of its effect stem solely from existence of 
state-monopoly of major exports and the black-market premium, while the criteria more 
directly related to trade policy have no significant explanatory power. This suggests that the 
indicator is actually not directly connected to trade policy, but indirectly through other 
channels. Similar to the Dollar-index, the SW-indicator may actually be closer to a measure of 
poor institutions and macroeconomic instability than trade openness. 
Interpreting econometric results is not very valuable without controlling for possible statistical 
problems such as endogeneity, autocorrelation and unit-root. Not accounting for such issues 
may result in biased estimates or incorrect standard errors.  As econometric techniques have 
evolved, so has the possibility to conduct proper sensitive analyses and to extensively test the 
findings, also on panel data over long time periods. Perhaps it is necessary making relatively 
improbable assumptions, and perhaps only a sole ambiguous test is available, but if that is the 
case, one must be very critical toward the findings’ robustness. Cross-country case studies are 
often used to bypass many of the econometric problems from time series, but the missing time 
factor also makes the results much less generalizable. This leaves us with no single, agreed-
                                                 
3 Criteria: 1. Average tariff higher than 40% 2. Nontariff-barriers covered on average more than 40% of imports 
3. Had a socialist economic system 4. State-monopoly of major exports 5. Black-market premium exceeded 20% 
during either the 1970s or the 1980s 
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upon method for how to estimate openness’ effect on economic growth, and consequently, 
more research is needed.  
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3 Theory 
3.1 The evolution of trade theory 
The basic framework of international trade theory has evolved over time. In its most 
fundamental form it can be explained by theories developed some two centuries ago. The 
microeconomic foundations in trade theory stem from the work by Adam Smith (1776) in his 
well-known book “Wealth of Nations”, but David Ricardo (1821) was the British banker and 
economist that first provided theoretical proof that international trade was beneficial for all. 
He showed that countries always have an incentive to trade with each other, as it allows them 
to exploit their comparative advantages (Krugman, Melitz, & Obstfeld, 2012, p. 64). This 
implies that even in the event that a country is inferior in productivity of producing all goods, 
it can still find relative advantages to other countries. Consider for example the tourist 
industry in Norway, where coaches from countries such as Estonia drive passengers around 
the fjords of the western coast. Assume that Norwegian bus drivers could handle 500 000 
passengers per season. Alternatively, Norway could produce 10 000 tons of salmon, which 
then constitute the alternative cost of driving 500 000 passengers. The high level of education 
and experience in Norway means that Norwegians are more efficient in producing salmon. 
Estonians could either drive these 500 000 passengers or produce 7 000 tons of salmon, that is 
the demand in the home market. If Norway sticks to the salmon, while Estonians handle the 
sightseeing tourists, one has the following changes in production: 
 TOURISTS TONS OF SALMON 
NORWAY -500 000 +10 000 
ESTONIA +500 000 -7 000 
TOTAL 0 +3 000 
Figure 3 - Production changes with trade 
  
In other words, Estonia is less or equally efficient in the production of both goods, but the 
sum of produced goods and services still increases when the two countries trade. It is thus the 
comparative advantage in productivity levels between countries that makes trade an additional 
source of economic gain for all countries. 
Ricardo’s model is intuitive and sensible, but at the same time, it assumes labour as the only 
factor of production. The Heckscher-Olin-model is named after two Swedish economists, and 
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it includes capital in the equation. The Heckscher-Olin-theorem is that: “Countries tend to 
export goods whose production is intensive in factors with which the countries are abundantly 
endowed.” (Krugman, Melitz, & Obstfeld, 2012, p. 121).  The result is much the same as in 
the Ricardian model, with all countries being better off than if they pursued autarky, but is a 
little more complex. 
Paul Krugman (2008) observed that, even though the traditional theory implied capital-rich 
countries should trade most with countries that had less capital and cheaper labour, the 
opposite was usually the case. This inspired him to come up with the “New trade theory”, 
where he allowed for the presence of economies of scale, probably the most important 
addition to the earlier models. The example used in this article is that making an airplane 
factory in every country in the world hardly seems efficient. Instead, there are only a few such 
factories worldwide, and they can run much more cost efficiently because of it. Initial 
advantages also play a role in determining which countries that are allowed to gain from 
economies of scale. As the world market become more integrated, new low-cost countries 
achieve comparative advantages in production of certain goods, but the current, established 
producers have power to prevent new entrants due to their economies of scale (Krugman, 
Melitz, & Obstfeld, 2012, p. 179). Even though this theory better fit the empirics, it did not 
radically change economists view on trade, or the main conclusion of trade theory, that trade 
allows for universal gains. 
3.2 Restricting international trade 
International trade is not unambiguously good, and one important aspect is its effect on 
distribution of income within a country. As input factors change in production so does 
demand for different goods, which in turn affects the industries. Also, certain sectors will 
incur losses after a country liberalises its trade policy. The general outcome is that “Trade 
benefits the factor that is specific to the export sector of each country, but hurts the factors 
specific to the import-competing sectors, with ambiguous effects on mobile factors.” 
(Krugman, Melitz, & Obstfeld, 2012, p. 93) . This might be one of the reasons why 
politicians, unions and other stakeholders may promote trade barriers; they wish to protect 
certain sectors in the domestic market. The most direct tool is perhaps tariffs, but there are 
also subtler tools, such as import quotas, subsidies or laws favouring local producers.  
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3.2.1 The effect of a Tariff  
A tariff is defined as a tax on an imported good, making the foreign goods more expensive in 
the domestic market. It can be a fixed amount on each unit or an “ad valorem” tariff, taxing a 
fraction of the value of the imported good. Tariffs distorts prices, hence demand and supply is 
affected. One can analyse a tariffs partial effect on a specific good using a partial equilibrium 
framework (Krugman, Melitz, & Obstfeld, 2012, p. 225). Suppose there are two countries, 
Home and Foreign, where both consume and produce the same good and there are no 
transportation costs. Let’s also assume that the exchange rate between the countries’ 
currencies are not affected by whatever trade-policies the countries have so the prices quoted 
for the good are in Home’s currency4. If trade initially is absent and the countries’ individual 
equilibrium-prices are different, then immediately after trade is introduced, supply would be 
shifted to the market where the demand is higher. If Home have the higher demand, 𝐷ℎ and 
Home producers supply, 𝑆ℎ, then Home have an import demand of 𝐷ℎ−𝑆ℎ. Suppose at the 
same time that Foreign have a higher supply, 𝑆𝑓, than consumers in Foreign demand, 𝐷𝑓, then 
Foreign have an export-supply of 𝑆𝑓 − 𝐷𝑓. With trade and no tariffs Home would import the 
excess supply from foreign and prices would settle at a world equilibrium price, 𝑃𝑤, such that: 
𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 + 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 = 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 + 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 
The world equilibrium price would be 𝑃𝑤 for both Home and Foreign, and is illustrated at 
point 1 in figure 4: 
                                                 
4 Perfect competition is assumed, and the market clears in equilibrium. 
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Now suppose that Home introduces a specific tariff that taxes every unit of the imported good 
by a fixed amount. In other words, 𝑡 is added to the price of Foreign if they sell the good to 
Home. Now Foreign exporters will only sell the good to Home if 𝑃ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 ≥ 𝑃𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 + 𝑡. 
A tariff will raise the price in Home to 𝑃𝑇, while lower the Foreign export price to  𝑃𝑇
∗ = 𝑃𝑇 −
𝑡. The higher price at Home will reduce demand (moves from point 1 to 2). The lower price in 
Foreign, due to excess supply, will reduce supply and increase demand of the good in 
Foreign. This will lead to a decrease in export 
supply from Foreign (move from point 1 to 3), 
while overall demand decrease from  𝑄𝑤 to 𝑄𝑇. 
The market is again in equilibrium, where Home 
imports equals Foreign exports and the price 
difference is 𝑃𝑇
∗ − 𝑃𝑇 = 𝑡. The tariff has reduced 
imports and caused a higher price at Home and a 
lower price in Foreign. The costs and benefits of 
the tariff for the importing country is illustrated 
in figure 5. 
 
Before the tariff is introduced, demand and supply is 𝐷1 and 𝑆1, with a world equilibrium 
price 𝑃𝑤. Home`s import volume is 𝐷1 − 𝑆1. Imposing the import tariff shifts the price of the 
Home market World market Foreign 
market 
Figure 4 – Effects of a tariff 
A tariff raises the price in Home while lowering the price in Foreign. This lead to a decline in the traded volume. The demand 
curves (D, D*, MD) are downward sloping as quantity demanded rises with lower prices. The supply-curves (S, S*, XS) are 
upward sloping as quantity supplied are rising with increasing prices. 
  
Figure 5 
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good to  𝑃𝑇 at Home and the Foreign export price falls to 𝑃𝑇
∗. Foreign’s exporters will only 
transport their goods at this price or above. The implications of the higher price are that 
demand and supply shift to 𝐷2 and 𝑆2 respectivly. The Home producer surplus rises by the 
dotted area labelled 𝑎, showing that Home producers gain from the tariff. Home consumers is 
worse of, since they face higher prices, and the loss of consumer surplus is indicated by the 
areas (𝑎 + 𝑏 + 𝑐 + 𝑑). The government gets tax-income equal to the tariff rate multiplied 
with units of the good that are imported from Foreign, 𝐷2 − 𝑆2. This tax gain is indicated by 
the areas (𝑐 + 𝑒) . The net cost of a tariff on welfare is: 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 = (𝑎 + 𝑏 + 𝑐 + 𝑑) − 𝑎 − (𝑐 + 𝑒) = 𝑏 + 𝑑 − 𝑒 (1) 
The efficiency loss of a tariff is 𝑏 + 𝑑  due to distorted incentives for producers and 
consumers, as they are led to act as if imports are more expensive than they really are. The 
gain from the tariff, 𝑒, arises due to the lower Foreign export price. Whether or not the net 
welfare effect is positive depends on who the consumers are, who the producers are and what 
the government spends the money on, among other things. 
If, on the other hand, Home’s market was not large enough to affect the world price, the case 
for most countries, the conclusion would not be the same. To grasp the effect of a tariff on a 
small country`s demand and supply, let’s look at Home before and after the tariff is imposed.  
In this case, the market in Home is small and have 
no effect on the Foreign export price. From figure 
6, the full effect of a tariff will now increase the 
Home price to 𝑃𝑤 + 𝑡 and demand will fall from 
𝐷1 to 𝐷2. Supply at Home will increase from 𝑆1 to 
𝑆2 due to the price increase, and imported goods 
after the tariff is in place will fall. This protects the 
domestic producers, which is often the primary 
objective of a tariff. Contrary to the case where 
Home is a price influencer, the importer has now 
no direct gains from imposing a tariff.  
3.2.1.1 The optimal tariff argument 
It is established that a tariff can improve a country’s “terms of trade”, since there are possible 
areas between full openness and autarky where countries are willing to trade with each other. 
If the distortions on producers and consumers are less than the gains from the improved terms 
Figure 6
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of trade, then a country can gain from a tariff. Edgeworth (1894) showed that as long as the 
countries tariff did not make the exporter change its quantity supplied, then the country would 
gain from a tariff (Irwin D. A., 1996). The search for an optimal tariff is not part of this thesis, 
but the argument that it exists provides another argument as to why countries are not fully 
open. 
3.2.2 Non-tariff barriers 
There is a range of different trade policy instruments available to a government (Krugman, 
Melitz, & Obstfeld, 2012, p. 232). A country can subsidise the export industry, or any 
industry at all for that matter, making their good relatively cheaper than foreign. It can 
introduce import quotas, direct public procurement toward domestic suppliers or require a 
certain fraction of final goods to be domestically produced. Or it can act even more subtle, 
just twisting regulations so that they are practically impossible for foreign suppliers to fulfil. 
A modern and relevant example of the latter is the “sell-by” date of milk in Greece (CNBC, 
2015). While other countries let the milk producers determine the “sell-by” date, the Greek 
government has decided that the permitted shelf-life of milk should be five days, effectively 
shutting foreign competition out of the Greek milk market. That this reportedly has resulted in 
higher milk prices comes as no surprise to an economist, as it is exactly the effect one would 
expect from what is in practice an import barrier (Krugman, Melitz, & Obstfeld, 2012, p. 
226). One could add to this the fact that some customers might prefer milk from one of the 
foreign producers, which means this customer gets less satisfaction than what is actually 
possible. Both higher prices and lack of options result in a loss of individual utility, and is a 
cost to society as direct consequences from trade barriers. 
There are also the distortionary effects stemming from the fact that countries that have 
comparative advantages over Greece in milk production. According to the theory, they could 
have used more resources on producing milk, Greece could have produced something else, 
resulting in gains for both parts. That is exactly why nearly all economists agree that free 
trade is good, and tariffs and other hidden trade barriers are bad. It has even been proposed 
that the restrictions on international trade imposed in USA as the Smoot-Hawley tariff caused 
the Great Depression (Krugman P. , 1996). The arguments are sensible, and the benefits of 
free trade seem obvious, but they still seem remarkably hard to prove empirically.  
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Part 3 
4 Method and data 
There is a range of different econometric challenges when trying to tease out causal effects in 
macroeconomic data. To get a trustworthy result, we will therefore employ different types of 
regressions, and then discuss how and why the results differ. 
4.1 Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
When running a pooled OLS, all observations are lumped together, and we assume that there 
is a linear relationship that is common for all countries. To make meaningful inference about 
the regressions we run using OLS, we have to rest our conclusions on a set of assumptions. If 
these are violated, the results cannot be trusted unless measures are taken to correct the 
present problems5. 
4.1.1 Unbiasedness of OLS 
We assume that the model is linear in parameters. In other words, the relationship between the 
variables must either be linear, or possible to capture with squared or log-transformed terms. 
Population growth is possibly a variable showing exponential growth, which leads us to use 
the natural log of population instead. Another necessary assumption for the estimator to be 
unbiased is that perfect collinearity is not present. In other words, no independent variable can 
be close to perfectly predicted by the other variables, because this can cause a bias in the 
estimate. Also, the so-called Zero Conditional Mean-assumption states that: 
𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑡) = 0 (2) 
 
Consequently, the level of country 𝑖’s error term cannot be affected by any of the explanatory 
variables at any point in time, 𝑡 . This assumption is very strict, and sometimes one can 
assume that a weaker assumption is sufficient, namely that the error term is unaffected by 
explanatory variables in the same time period. 
If we assume that the error term consists of two parts, such as: 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (3) 
                                                 
5 All information about the necessary assumptions are taken from Wooldridge (2014, pp. 279-285) 
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where the independent and identically distributed error term 𝑒𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2), then 𝑎𝑖 captures 
unobserved, country specific fixed effects. This could be for example geographic variations or 
the culture in a country, which is not controlled for in the model. Such effects will usually be 
present in a macroeconomic panel data set, and if they influence both the dependent and 
independent variables, the zero conditional mean-assumption is violated. Eliminating such 
constant, country-specific effects from the data is possible, and will be discussed in the 
section about panel data methods. 
4.1.2 Unbiasedness of variance 
To be able to trust the reported standard errors, and hence make meaningful inference, two 
additional conditions must be satisfied. First, we assume homoscedasticity in the error term, 
meaning that its variance is the same for all periods and levels. Formally, the assumption is: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑡) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎
2 (4) 
 
If the standard errors are suspected to be heteroskedastic, inference is not possible without 
correcting them. There are available methods in Stata, and we will report the tests we run and 
the measures we take as we progress. 
There is also the assumption of no serial correlation, or autocorrelation. This state that, 
conditional on X, the error terms in two different time periods, 𝑡 and 𝑠, are not correlated over 
time. Formally, the notation of no serial correlation is: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑢𝑡, 𝑢𝑠|𝑋) = 0, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠 (5) 
If this is not the case, the errors suffer from serial correlation, even though the conditioning on 
X is often ignored in practice. This is also the case if constant, country specific effects 𝑎𝑖 are 
present, since they by definition will be present in all periods, and differ for each country. 
Even though the estimated coefficients are still consistent in the presence of serial correlation, 
the standard errors renders inference pointless (Wooldridge J. , 2014, p. 331). 
4.2 Instrument Variable Regression 
We might be worried that openness to trade is endogenous, since it is probably affected by 
both economic, political, cultural, geographic and demographic features of a country, which 
in turn may be tied to wealth. Applying openness directly in a regression will thus result in a 
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spurious relationship with growth. In such cases, it is possible to use a two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimator to obtain unbiased estimates. This estimator is less efficient than OLS if the 
explanatory variables are exogenous, and one should therefore test for the presence of 
endogeneity6. In such a test, the null hypothesis is that the suspected endogenous regressor 
can be treated as exogenous7 (Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2007). 
The procedure for the 2SLS, as indicated by the name, consists of two stages. The first stage 
is a regression on the endogenous variable, where fitted values hopefully free from 
endogenous variation are obtained. This is done by using instruments to explain the 
endogenous variable. The second stage is a regression on the independent variable, including 
the fitted values instead of the endogenous variable. There are two conditions for a valid 
instrument, the first that it must be correlated with the endogenous variable, so that the 
instrument is relevant in predicting it. The second condition is that the instrument should be 
uncorrelated with the dependent variable, or that it is exogenous.  
4.2.1 Instrument relevance 
The relevance condition can formally be written like equation (6), 
𝐶𝑂𝑉(𝑥, 𝑧) ≠ 0 (6) 
Consider the following example of a linear 2SLS-model for panel data: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃1 𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (7) 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡  is the dependent variable, 𝑋𝑖𝑡  the endogenous regressor, 𝐶𝑖𝑡  is a vector of control 
variables and 𝑢𝑖𝑡  is the error term assumed to have zero mean and constant variance, 𝑢𝑖𝑡  ~ 
N(0, 𝜎2). Equation (7) is the structural equation where  𝛽1 is the parameter of interest. To get an 
unbiased estimate of 𝛽1 a reduced-form equation is first estimated: 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝜋1𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2 𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 (8) 
                                                 
6 The asymptotic variance of the 2SLS-estimator is computed according to the following formula: 𝜎
2
𝑛𝜎𝑥2𝜌𝑥,𝑧2
⁄ , 
where 𝜎𝑥
2 is the population variance of the endogenous variable x, 𝜎2 is the population variance of u and 𝜌𝑥,𝑧
2  is 
the square of the population correlation between x and the instrument z. The last term is what causes the variance 
of the 2SLS-estimator to be larger than for OLS, and thus less efficient, since it is between zero and unity. 
7 The endogeneity-test compares the difference between two Sargan-Hansen statistics, one for the equation with 
the smaller set of instruments, where the suspected regressor is treated as endogenous, and one equation with the 
larger set of instruments, where the suspect regressor is treaded as exogenous, is tested. The test is robust to 
different violations of conditional homoscedasticity. In Stata, this test [endog(var)], is available after xtivreg2 
(Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2007). 
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Equation (8) relates the instruments, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 , to the endogenous regressor, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 . The instruments 
should at least have a statistically significant effect explaining 𝑋𝑖𝑡. In the case where 𝜋1 is 
zero, the instruments are unusable and irrelevant (Stock, Wright, & Yogo, 2002). Preferably they 
should have a high t-value and F-value, the latter if more than one instrument is applied, 
indicating that the instruments are relevant. A common rule of thumb is that the F-value 
should be at least 10, but there are also more complex methods for evaluating the strength the 
instruments. A particularly useful method is that of Stock & Yogo (2002)8. They point out 
that weak instruments may produce biased estimates and one should be careful to only 
interpret the F-statistic. 
To control for the presence of weak instruments, one may use the test by Stock & Yogo 
(2002) to produce an F-statistic, and compare this to the appropriate critical values9. These 
values are constructed to test for weak instruments, and give an indication of whether or not 
the instruments are useable.  
“The critical value is determined by the IV estimator the researcher is using, the number of 
instruments K2, the number of included endogenous regressors N, and how much bias or size 
distortion the researcher is willing to tolerate.” (Stock & Yogo, 2002, s. 32) 
The relative bias threshold is set at how much bias the researcher can accept relative to the 
bias in the OLS-estimator. With relevant, exogenous and strong instruments the 2SLS-
estimator is consistent compared to the biased OLS-estimator with the endogenous regressor. 
The strength of the instruments decides this bias, and the weaker the instruments, the higher 
the bias in the 2SLS-estimator and the closer its estimate is to the OLS-estimate (Stock, 
Wright, & Yogo, 2002). The second threshold is size distortions. With weak instruments, the 
actual size of a five percent 2SLS t-test is actually higher, thus making the researchers reject 
true null hypotheses more frequently than indicated by the p-value. To account for this, the 
researcher has to decide at which level of size distortion one should reject the null hypothesis.  
Weak instruments are also not a small sample problem, as studies show that it persists in large 
samples (Bound, Jaeger, & Baker, 1995). Where we use IV-regressions, we will report these 
test statistics and critical values, and watch for signs of our instruments being too weak. 
                                                 
8 These test-statistics are available in Stata with xtivreg2 
9 See Stock & Yogo (2002) for critical values 
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4.2.2 Instrument exogeneity 
The second condition, that the instrumental variable must be plausibly exogenous, can 
formally be stated like this: 
𝐶𝑂𝑉(𝑧, 𝑢) = 0 (9) 
The implication of equation (9) is that the instrumental variable must be uncorrelated with the 
independent variable beyond the indirect correlation through the endogenous variable. Factors 
that the instruments indirectly affect, which in turn may affect our dependent variable, must 
be controlled for. The exogeneity condition cannot usually be tested formally; one must argue 
by economic sense why it is plausible that the instrument is exogenous. However, if there is 
more than one instrument explaining the endogenous variable, one may conduct an 
overidentification test. Using one instrument at a time in the structural equation, one obtains 
the different estimates of the coefficient of interest, and test if these estimates are the same 
when each instrument is applied. If two instruments are tested, and the coefficients are equal, 
that is an indication that both instruments are exogenous. One drawback is that if the null 
hypothesis is rejected, and the estimates are statistically different, the conclusion is that either 
one of the instruments or neither are exogenous (Wooldridge J. , 2014, pp. 428-431). 
4.3 Panel data methods 
The pooled OLS and the 2SLS regressions rely crucially on the unobserved, country specific 
effects to be independent of all the explanatory variables, an assumption that in many cases is 
not very realistic. The unobserved characteristics of a country often impact both economic 
growth and several of its explanatory variables, in which case the reported slope coefficients 
will be biased. To account for such effects, also taking advantage of the fact that panel data 
are used, either a first difference model or a fixed effect model can be employed. 
A fixed effect (FE) model subtracts the mean for each individual in the dataset, such that only 
slope coefficients are measured. A simple way to think of it is that by using an FE-model, all 
the countries observations are plotted relative to their own mean, so that they are lumped 
together around origin. Assume equation (10) is your pooled OLS-model:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (10) 
You suspect the unobserved, constant individual specific parameter 𝑎𝑖 is correlated with both 
the dependent and independent variable, and you want to use the FE-procedure to eliminate it 
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from the model. Hence, the mean over time for each individual is removed, which can be 
formally stated like this: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦?̅? = 𝛽(𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥?̅?) + (𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖) + (𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝑒?̅?) (11) 
The troubling parameter 𝑎𝑖 is removed in equation (11), and will hence not induce any biases. 
The downside is that all other time invariant effects also are removed, even though you would 
perhaps want to keep them in the model. If so, the random effect (RE) estimator is the correct 
tool, but this requires that the unobserved fixed effects are uncorrelated with the independent 
variables. An easy way to figure out which of FE and RE is the correct estimator, is to use the 
Hausman-test to check whether or not they produce identical estimates. If so, the RE-
estimator produces more efficient estimates, but if the coefficients are different, RE is biased 
and one should choose the FE-estimator. 
An alternative is to use the first-difference (FD) estimator, where the model in period t-1 is 
subtracted from period t. Since the problematic term 𝑎𝑖 is constant in every period, it is also 
here removed from the model. The equation for the FD-estimator is: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛽(𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1) + (𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖) + (𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1) (12) 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽∆𝑥𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝑒𝑖𝑡 (13) 
If there are only two periods, the FE- and FD-estimator will produce the same results, but for 
any 𝑇 ≥ 3, the estimates will not be equal. The most important aspect when choosing between 
the two is whether or not 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is serially correlated. If it is, while ∆𝑒𝑖𝑡 is not, FD is the better 
choice. If there is no serial correlation, or ∆𝑒𝑖𝑡 is in fact serially correlated, you are probably 
better off using FE (Wooldridge J. , 2014, p. 392). Alas, it is often unclear whether or not the 
serial correlation is sufficiently large to render FD the best choice. In such cases, it might be 
best to use both models and examine the difference in your estimates. Best case scenario is if 
the results are not sensitive. Worst case, they differ substantially, and the challenge is to 
determine why. 
Cross-sectional dependence may also be present in a panel data setting, a challenge that has 
become more relevant as datasets with larger N and T are available. The more integrated 
global economy of the later decades means a higher degree of common shocks. Cross-
sectional dependence reduces the efficiency of the estimator as shocks in one country affects 
the disturbances in another. It also violates the assumption that the errors should be 
uncorrelated over time, also leading to less efficient estimations (Hoyos & Sarafidis, 2006). 
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Pesaran (2004) propose a test for dependency across clusters that are robust to unbalanced 
datasets including structural breaks in slope coefficient and errors. The power of the test is 
also good when T is small and N large. The null hypothesis is that the error terms 𝜀𝑖𝑡 and 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
for all countries 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, are independently distributed and serially uncorrelated with zero mean 
and constant variance. Testing the pairwise correlation between panels indicates if the null 
hypothesis holds10. We report the p-values from tests of cross-sectional dependence in each 
regression, but accounting for it is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
4.4 Unit-root processes 
If a shock to a variable persists over time, so that the variable does not revert back to its mean 
or trend-line, we say that the time series contains a unit root, or that it is non-stationary 
(Wooldridge J. , 2014, p. 318). In macroeconomic datasets such as ours, GDP is one variable 
we could suspect of having a unit root. In that case, a positive shock in Norwegian GDP in 
1970 would still be present, affecting todays level of GDP. Running least squares-regressions 
on series containing unit root can lead to spurious results, and consequently it is not possible 
to make meaningful inference. If the time series on change form, for example: 
∆GDP
cap
𝑡
 =  
GDP
cap
𝑡
 – 
GDP
cap
𝑡−1
(14) 
are stationary, but it is a unit-root process on level form, we say that the time series is 
integrated of order one, or I(1). The differenced term can then be used in a regression, and the 
results will be consistent. Otherwise, the use of non-stationary time series in regressions 
usually lead to spurious results. However, there is one exception to this rule, and that is when 
the variables in use are all I(1), and they are cointegrated (Wooldridge J. , 2014, p. 512). 
Consider the following equation: 
𝑒𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 − 𝛽𝑋𝑡 (15) 
If there exists a value of 𝛽 that makes 𝑒𝑡 a stationary process, in other words that 𝑒𝑡 is I(0), 
then Y and X are cointegrated, and they may be used in a regression on level form. 
                                                 
10 The test can be used in Stata using the following commands: “ssc install xtcsd”, “xtcsd, pesaran”. 
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4.5 Data and descriptive statistics 
Appendix 1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables of interest. The dataset is 
unbalanced and includes variables over a maximum time period of 41 years (1970-2011) for 
146 countries. Real GDP per capita is our preferred measure of economic wealth11 . We 
choose to log-transform this variable, since GDP in many cases grows exponentially, meaning 
a log-transformed variable will be a better fit in a linear model. The main explanatory variable 
is openness to trade, an index that ranges from 0.043 – 0.98. Variables that possibly correlate 
with both openness and GDP need to be controlled for. The main input factors from the 
Solow-model, capital and labour, are included 12 . We also include population, as it is 
reasonable to assume that change in population and number of persons engaged have 
individual partial effects. With the same argument as for GDP, both capital, labour and 
population are log-transformed. To capture the productivity in the work force, we also include 
a measure of human capital per worker and life-expectancy at birth13. Year-specific dummy 
variables are included to control for common shocks and crises. It is assumed that poor and 
rich countries have different growth rates, so that GDP-levels converge over time. To control 
for this, the initial level of GDP per capita in 1970 is also included. These are the main control 
variables used throughout the analyses14. 
In addition to the main control variables, other variables will be included to test the robustness 
of the findings. These are variables that potentially correlate with growth and openness, but 
that we have omitted in the main specification to reduce the possibility of multicollinearity 
and endogeneity bias. These variables include price level, government expenditure, degree of 
social and political globalisation, international trade as share of GDP, the international oil 
price, a polity index, a dummy variable for left-oriented government and a dummy variable 
for the period after 1990. The latter variable is included because average level of openness has 
increased at a higher pace after 199015. 
                                                 
11 Expenditure-side real GDP per capita at chained PPPs (in mill. 2005US$) 
12 The measure of capital is the capital stock at current PPPs (in mill. 2005US$). The capital stock is measured 
from series on investment in buildings and different types of machinery, and is converted with relative prices for 
structures and equipment that are constant across countries (Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, The Next Generation 
of the Penn World Table, 2013). The measure of labour is the number of persons engaged (in millions). 
13 The index is based on linearly interpolated average years of schooling, and an assumed rate of return for 
primary, secondary and tertiary education (Barro & Lee, 2013; Caselli, 2005; Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, The 
Next Generation of the Penn World Table, 2013). 
14 To save space, the regression output will not always explicitly report these variables, but only an indication 
that they are included. 
15 See figure 1, page 8 
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We will also conduct an IV-regression, and apply four instrumental variables. Voting 
alignment with the United States in the UN General Assembly is an index ranging from 0 to 
1, where 1 indicates that a country, in any given year, always voted the same as the United 
States16. Percentage of children immune to DPT17 is a measure ranging from 0 to 1, that takes 
the value 1 if all children in a country are immune to DPT in the given year. Years as a 
GATT/WTO member is a variable indicating how many years a country have been a member 
of GATT/WTO, starting at unity the year after entry. Lastly, the distance from equator is 
measured with absolute latitude. 
  
                                                 
16 The following countries have a smaller gap of missing values (1-2 years) in their data that have been linearly 
interpolated: Burundi (1990), Dominican Republic (1994-1995) and Mauritania (1999). 
17 DPT is short for diphtheria, pertussis (also known as whooping cough) and tetanus 
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Part 4 
5 Analysis 
5.1 Testing variables for non-stationarity 
If variables are non-stationary, they may not be used in regressions unless cointegrated. 
Testing for unit-root should be first in line when considering which variables to include in the 
structural model. The test results are presented in appendix 2, where we most importantly note 
that the natural log of GDP per capita exhibits non-stationarity. Since it is an I(1) process, it 
may only be used on first differenced form, meaning that we analyse the effect of the 
independent variables on GDP per capita annual growth, and not level. After all, there is 
nothing a country can do about its present level of wealth, it may only affect growth to reach 
higher levels in the future, so this is not a big problem for our analyses. Henceforth, the 
annual growth rate of GDP per capita is denoted ∆𝑌𝑖𝑡. The control variables that are I(1) will 
only be used in first-differenced form. 
Openness is the explanatory variable of main interest, and as explained earlier, it is an index 
ranging from a minimum value of 0.043, to a maximum value of 0.983. The test indicates that 
this is a non-stationary I(1) process for some of the countries in the data set. This is also true 
for social globalisation, a variable employed in robustness tests. However, unit-root tests have 
been shown to be biased towards indicating unit-root when the time series contain structural 
breaks (Stock J. H., 1994, p. 2818). The definition of a stationary process is that it reverts 
back to its mean, or to its trend-line, which hardly make any sense for a policy variable, 
politicians rarely aiming to reverse their own policy after a few years. The openness indicator 
has little or no explanatory power on change form, understandably given that it shows several 
periods with little change. Consequently, openness is applied on level form in the regressions, 
while instead the residuals from our preferred model are tested for unit-root for each country. 
The weakness of unit-root tests for panel data is that rejecting the null of non-stationarity 
implies that at least one country has stationary residuals, which is not very informative. Since 
we run several regressions, the residuals of each country for each regression are tested for 
unit-root. To be able to trust the results from different regressions, countries that have non-
stationary residuals at a five percent significance level are omitted. 
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5.2 Regression analysis by pooled OLS 
A natural first step is to use pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The potential problem of 
endogeneity in the openness index will be handled at a later stage. We start out by testing the 
residuals of the countries for non-stationarity in the main specification of the model, removing 
those which time series are not stationary18. This leaves us with 92 countries. It is previously 
shown that the presence of autocorrelation in the error term lead to biased standard errors, and 
even biased estimates if the sample is small19. To test for this, the Wooldridge test for serial 
correlation in panel data is applied (Wooldridge J. M., 2002, p. 282; Drukker, 2003). The test 
rejects the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the pooled OLS-model, with a p-value of 
0.063. The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected with a p-value of 0.007, meaning 
that the standard errors  are heteroskedastic20. We conduct the regressions with clustered 
standard errors, robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. 
All regression results are presented in appendix 3, where the pooled OLS-regressions are 
presented in table 1. The OLS regression equation is: 
∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2 𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (16) 
Where 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖, + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  is the random error term, ∆𝑌𝑖𝑡  is the growth rate of GDP per capita for 
country 𝑖 at time 𝑡 and 𝐶𝑖𝑡 is a vector of control variables including year specific effects. In order 
to obtain unbiased estimates, the unobserved, fixed effects, 𝑎𝑖, need to be uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables, which is assumed in this case. 
First, only openness is included in the regression (1), and then control variables are 
incrementally included to see their individual effects on openness 21 . We find that the 
coefficient on openness is significantly different from zero in two cases. One is the case 
where no control variables are included (1), where it takes the value 0.0204, significant on a 1 
percent significance level. This implies that a one-unit increase in the openness indicator 
corresponds with an increased growth rate of 0.02 percentage points. As soon as year-specific 
effects are controlled for, the coefficient becomes insignificant (2), but when capital is also 
included (3), the coefficient is significantly different from zero on a 10 percent significance 
level. When additional control variables are included (4-8), it stays insignificant. In the 
                                                 
18 An Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root test is run on each individual country, and a Phillips-Perron unit-root 
test are run for the whole panel data set, to test for presence of non-stationarity in the residuals (one lag). 
19 Test results for all estimators are presented in appendix 4, table 5 
20 Heteroskedasticity is tested using a Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test, conducted in Stata 14.0 by the “estat 
hettest”-command 
21 All regression coefficients imply a ceteris paribus effect, assuming all other variables are held constant 
31 
 
regression where all control variables are included (8), the coefficient takes the value -0.0013. 
It is not significantly different from zero, with a p-value of 0.811. That the coefficient changes 
when the different control variables are included indicates that they are relevant in the 
regression, and they all have the expected signs. The results confirm that there exists some 
positive relationship between economic growth and openness (1), but this relationship 
disappears as other effects are controlled for. 
To test the robustness of this finding, we include several additional control variables (table 
1.1). The coefficient remains insignificant in all but one occasion, and this is when the index 
measuring social globalization is included, inducing a positive shift in the openness-
coefficient (3). Openness and social globalisation is positively correlated, and the coefficient 
on social globalisation is negative, causing a negative bias on openness in the initial 
regressions. By including this variable, openness again has a positive relationship with 
economic growth, albeit only significant at a 10 percent significance level. There is also some 
concern that social globalisation index is endogenous. While both change in price level and 
the oil price are significant (1 and 7), the coefficient on openness remains insignificant. 
We find no effect of openness on growth that is statistically different from zero, and robust to 
changes in specification, and there are several possible reasons for why this is the case. It 
could be that pooling all observations together, an action that implies a common intercept, 
simply is a poor fit for the data. It could also be that there are important omitted variables 
affecting both openness and economic growth, or that there is a reverse causality bias. We 
therefore choose to test other estimators to see if the results differ. 
5.3 Regression analysis by FE-estimator 
It could be that country-specific effects that are unobserved in the model have explanatory 
power on both GDP-growth and the openness indicator, and an FE-regression is a natural 
second step. After removing countries that show signs of unit-root in the residuals from the 
main specification of the model, 89 countries remain in the FE-regressions. Testing for serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity gives the same conclusion as in the pooled OLS-model, and 
the standard errors are clustered in the FE-model as well 22. We could use the First Difference-
estimator, but there are several countries with little variation in openness over time. Hence, 
we prefer the FE-model because it keeps more of the within-country variation. An F-test 
                                                 
22 Heteroskedasticity is tested using a modified Wald-test (Baum C. F., 2001), and serial correlation with the 
Wooldridge test. 
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rejects the null hypothesis that there are no fixed effects in the model, with a p-value of 0.00, 
implying that a pooled OLS-estimator is not preferable. The Hausman-test rejects the null 
hypothesis stating that a random effect model yields the same results as a fixed effect model, 
at all significance levels, which leads us to use the FE-estimator since it is consistent. We 
proceed allowing each country to have their own intercept. Formally, the equation for the FE-
model is: 
∆ 𝑌𝑖𝑡 −∆𝑌𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =  𝛽1(𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) + 𝜃2 (𝐶𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶?̅?) + (𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎?̅?) + (𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝑒?̅?) (17) 
Equation (17) shows that the omitted constant, country-specific effects 𝑎𝑖 is removed, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
is the remaining random error term. The FE-regressions are presented in table 2. As in the 
former analysis, the coefficient is positive and statistically different from zero on a 1 percent 
significance level when no control variables are included (1). As soon as year-specific effects 
are included in the regression, the coefficient becomes insignificant (2). It changes marginally 
when additional control variables are included, and it remains statistically insignificant (3-7). 
When the main control variables are included, the coefficient on openness, that was -0.0013 in 
the pooled OLS-model, turns positive, and is 0,024 in the FE-regression (7). Since initial 
wealth is time-invariant, it is omitted from the FE-regression. That the coefficient becomes 
more positive compared to the pooled OLS-model indicates that the omitted, country-specific 
fixed effects correlate oppositely with openness and growth, inducing a negative bias in the 
openness-coefficient when not removed. One puzzle that is worth mentioning is how the 
coefficient on human capital turns negative and significant in the FE-regression. This is 
counterintuitive, but reportedly not unique to our regression (Arcand & d’Hombres, 2007; De 
la Fuente & Doménech, 2002). The problem might stem from lack of variation in the variable 
or econometric specification problems. It seems that cross-sectional analyses get the expected 
positive coefficient, and that it is the time-series aspect of the model that results in the 
negative value. We find that whether or not human capital is included in the model have a 
slight effect on the coefficient on openness.  
When including additional control variables (table 2.1), the result is in line with the findings 
in the pooled OLS-model. Openness is significantly different from zero at a ten percent 
significance level when social globalisation is included. The coefficient indicates that a one-
unit increase in the openness index corresponds with a 0.035 percentage point increase in 
annual growth.  
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The FE-estimator yields two coefficients on openness that are statistically significant from 
zero. This is where no control variables are included and when social globalisation is 
controlled for. These are not reliable due to omitted variables and endogeneity respectively, 
and we will therefore proceed with a different approach. 
5.4 Regressions analysis by instrument variables 
There are some worries that the openness indicator is not exogenous, leading to suspicion that 
the estimates cannot be trusted where openness is used directly. It could be that richer 
countries are more open, perhaps because they expect more gains due to their high level of 
trade or strong institutions. This is a classic case of reverse causality, and it will induce a 
biased coefficient on openness. It could also be that there are omitted variables that affect 
both openness and growth. In such a case, the direction of the bias depends on the correlation 
between the omitted variables, openness and growth. If such variables are constant over time, 
the FE-estimator takes care of the problem. We assume that the time period in question is 
sufficiently short that social characteristics are removed in an FE-model. This applies to 
institutions as well, perhaps to a smaller degree, but for some countries, that is not the case. 
We suspect that these and other omitted variables affect the level of openness, and that there 
possibly is reverse causality. To see whether or not we can single out an exogenous effect of 
openness on growth, we continue with the 2SLS-estimator. 
5.4.1 The instrumental variables for openness 
To measure the effect of openness on growth we will use several instruments. The four 
instruments applied are number of years as a GATT/WTO member, the percentage of children 
immune to DPT, the absolute latitude of a country and voting similarity with the U.S. in the 
United Nations General Assembly. For these instruments to be plausibly exogenous they 
should have no effect on the dependent variable. In equation (18), a simple model explaining 
the exclusion restriction is presented: 
∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐺𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐷𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (18) 
For the 𝑘 instrumental variables to be exogenous, 𝛾𝑘 should be zero. If this is true, they are 
exogenous. In equation (19), we need 𝛿𝑘 ≠ 0, for the instruments to have explanatory power. 
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  𝜆 +  𝛿1𝐺𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐷𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 (19) 
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5.4.2 Arguments for choice of instrumental variables 
5.4.2.1 Years as member of GATT/WTO 
That a variable initially was correlated with the dependent variable, but ex post is uncorrelated 
with it, makes it more plausible to assume it exogenous. We argue that this is the case for the 
number of years as a member of GATT/WTO. GATT was the trade agreement that later 
turned into an organization, the WTO, both aiming to reduce tariffs and promote trade. As 
such, it may be reasonable to assume that member states over time are influenced to reduce 
trade barriers, opening up the country to foreign goods. At the time of admission, there may 
have been transitory effects correlating with GDP-growth in a country, possibly in both 
directions, but over time they should disappear or be marginal. 
It is not random which countries joined in the earliest years of GATT’s existence, but a 
variable for initial wealth or the FE-estimator will remove most of the possible endogeneity 
resulting from this. We further assume that, if endogeneity is indeed present, this will mostly 
be county-specific and time-invariant. Using an FE-model instrumental variable approach will 
remove the most worrisome effects, leaving us with the exogenous variation. When a country 
has remained member for years, there is likely no connection between additional years of 
membership and economic growth, beyond the possible linkage through attitude towards trade 
barriers.  
Davis and Wilf (2013) claims that countries generally don’t liberalize their trade policy before 
becoming members, but that democracy and foreign policy similarity plays the most 
important role. If this is correct, there is little need for worrying about reverse causality. We 
have also found that the direct impact of GATT/WTO on trade policy has been limited for 
many years, due to the challenge of making a very diverse group agree on such important 
matters. This has led to an explosion in regional and bilateral trade agreements, while 
GATT/WTO have played a minor role (Rose, 2002). We interpret this as a sign that the 
number of year as a member says more about how much time the individual country has had 
to “mature” towards trade openness, limiting any other possible effects on economic growth. 
In other words, the variable captures the attitude towards openness more than actual policy 
change, and hence GDP-growth should not be directly influenced. 
5.4.2.2 Share of children immune to DPT 
The percentage of children immune to DPT is to a very large degree determined by whether 
or not people have been vaccinated, and it is our second suggested instrument for openness. 
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The vaccination program began in 1949 and WHO expanded it in 1974 to hike the levels of 
immunization in in developing countries (Immunization Action Coalition, 2015). Our 
measure of immunization to DPT is from 1980-2011, and is percentage of children in a 
country that is immune. The fact that the program started in 1974 and is not measured until 
1980 makes it predetermined, so it should have little or no direct effect on GDP in the years it 
is measured. The same is the case since the share of immune children will not immediately 
increase as vaccinations are handed out, but rather with a delay. That it correlates with 
openness might be down to factors such as trust in international science and healthcare, and 
admission to foreign knowledge and products. When a country accepts vaccination programs, 
they effectively open up to the world, an effect likely to persist. Vaccination could be 
correlated with GDP through higher life expectancy and human capital, hence we control for 
this. Epidemic outbreaks could have an effect on labour force participation, and consequently 
a negative effect on economic growth. One of the more severe outbreaks of DPT came in the 
former Soviet regions, where around 5,000 deaths were reported in the period 1990-1995 
(Dittmann, et al., 2000). In macroeconomic terms, it is hard to see that this would heavily 
influence such a large economic system as the Soviet Union. Also, by controlling for persons 
engaged in a country we pick up most of this effect. As immunization reaches a high level, 
these kind of occurrences are few and relatively small. We draw the conclusion that the share 
of children immune to DPT does not correlate with the error term, and is hence exogenous 
after controlling for various effects discussed above. 
5.4.2.3 Share of votes equal to the U.S. in the United Nations General Assembly 
A third instrument is voting alignment with United States in the UN General Assembly. This 
is an indicator of how closely aligned to the U.S. a country is politically in international 
matters. Such an alignment is a visual sign that a country has some political or cultural 
similarity with the US, considered to be a country very actively promoting international 
integration and trade. Similar voting should therefore be correlated with liberal trade policies. 
It could be the case that the US would “reward” countries that vote similar to them, for 
example by directing more aid to such countries, or trade more with them. In extreme cases, 
this could be true, but it is not likely the case for most of the world. The private market 
constitutes most of a country’s GDP, and private actors are not very likely to respond to 
voting in the UN. We assume that any possible effect of aid or increased trade, if at all 
present, would have a very limited effect on aggregate economic growth, and thus choose to 
disregard it. Beyond the possible linkage through increased openness, we find little ground for 
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suspecting voting in the UN to directly affect growth in your own country, and we therefore 
make the claim that voting similarity with the US is both relevant and plausibly exogenous. 
5.4.2.4 Distance from equator 
Geographic characteristics of a country have also been used as instruments for openness to 
trade, and have been proven both relevant and exogenous (Frankel & Romer, 1999). We will 
use absolute latitude as an instrument for trade openness as it can be showed that countries 
with lower absolute latitude are less inclined to pursue liberal trade policies. This could 
possibly be due to variations in underlying cultural or political preferences between countries 
in different climatic regions.  
It is sometimes argued that the harsh conditions close to the Equator, with high humidity and 
temperatures, and various insects and diseases, have hampered the economic growth in such 
regions. However, moving away from the equator, there are other challenges such as intensely 
hot deserts, or extreme cold further north. Also, previous research has found little or no direct 
effect of latitude on wealth, after controlling for other factors23. Therefore, we choose to 
include absolute latitude as an instrument variable, claiming it to be both relevant and 
plausibly exogenous. 
5.4.3 Testing the instruments 
5.4.3.1 Instrument relevance and exogeneity 
Whether or not the instruments are relevant is easily tested by including them in a regression 
on openness, and examining their individual t-statistics and the joint F-statistic. One may also 
use the Stock & Yogo test for weak instruments to find out how strongly the instruments 
predict openness. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic24 (henceforth KP-statistic) is then 
compared with the critical values from Stock & Yogo (2002). Since we want strong 
instruments, we do not accept a relative bias higher than five percent. In other words, 
maximum five percent of the predicted bias from the OLS estimate is allowed in the 2SLS 
estimate. This critical value is only available for regressions with more than one exclusion 
restriction. To be certain that we only reject the null hypothesis at the appropriate level, size 
distortions are not allowed to exceed the 10 percent threshold. In other words, we only trust 
regressions where this test allows us to believe the reported p-value on openness. When the 
instruments have a KP-statistic above these critical values, we will report them as strong.  
                                                 
23 See Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson (2000) and Hall & Jones (1999) 
24 In the regression tables, this value is reported as the “F-value excluded instruments” 
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It is assumed that the instruments are exogenous, and that they only affect economic growth 
through openness. Since there are more instruments available than the number of endogenous 
regressors, it is possible to test the instruments for endogeneity with an overidentification test. 
The question is first whether or not the individual variables are relevant, and then if the 
overidentification test accepts that those relevant variables produce the same coefficient on 
openness. Since the OLS-, RE- and FE-regressions with control variables are somewhat 
similar, we run the IV-regressions both in pooled 2SLS form, and with a fixed effect 2SLS 
form. 
5.4.4 Pooled 2SLS-regression 
We first run pooled 2SLS regressions with both single instrumental variables and different 
combinations, where the first and second stage regressions are presented in table 3. The main 
control variables are included. After the unit-root test of the residuals from the regression with 
the main specification, 87 countries remain. Heteroskedasticity is present, but the Wooldridge 
test for autocorrelation no longer rejects the null hypothesis, with a p-value at 0.33. This leads 
us to use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors25. We find that all instrumental variables 
are relevant in predicting openness, except when years as member of GATT/WTO is included 
alone (4). This variable is significant, however, when it is included in both level and squared 
form (5), indicating that there is a non-linear relationship. The strength of the different 
instrumental variables is encouraging. The KP-statistic for the regressions with single 
instrumental variables (1-4) take high values except for GATT/WTO-membership. Latitude 
(1), voting in line with U.S. (2) and share of children immune to DPT (3) are all deemed 
strong. When years as GATT/WTO-member is included in both level and squared form, it is 
significant on a one-percent level, but it is borderline weak (5).  
We have determined that the instruments are relevant, and in most cases strong, and turn to 
analysing their validity. Different combinations of instruments are tested, and the Hansen J-
statistic from the overidentification test cannot reject that different instruments yield 
statistically different estimates on openness (6-8).  
The estimates on openness are not equally exciting. Only one regression gets an estimate 
significantly different from zero, which is when voting alignment with USA and years as 
member of GATT/WTO (level and squared form) are the included instrumental variables for 
                                                 
25 Presence of heteroskedasticity is tested with an analog of the Breusch-Pagan test, regressing the squared 
residual from the IV-regression on all exogenous variables, including the instruments. The joint significance-test 
rejects the null of homoskedasticity. 
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openness (7). Combined, they are strong instruments for openness. The coefficient is different 
from zero only on a 10 percent significance level, and states that a one-unit increase in the 
openness indicator corresponds with a 0.057 percentage point decrease in economic growth. 
Openness is also rejected as exogenous with a p-value of 0.099, an indication that it is correct 
to pursue an IV-model. Since this is the only result where the effect of openness on growth is 
statistically different from zero, we proceed to test the robustness of regression (7), presented 
in table 3.126. We are mainly interested in inspecting whether the validity of the instrumental 
variables holds, and if the estimated coefficient on openness remains negative and statistically 
significant. The validity of the instruments holds throughout all robustness checks, while the 
estimate becomes statistically insignificant when either change in price level (1) or the left-
oriented government-variable (5) is included. Changes in price level might function as a 
proxy variable for distortionary macroeconomic policy, or an unstable macroeconomic 
environment. The openness-coefficient otherwise remains significant on a 10 percent 
significance level, and also on a five percent level when the polity-index is included (4). This 
is an indication that, when policy variables are analysed, controlling for the institutional 
characteristics of a country is important. These findings are in line with the arguments of 
Rodriguez & Rodrik (2000), that openness indicators often capture effects of poor institutions 
or macroeconomic instability if they are not internalised in the model. Such variables may 
also be endogenous, however, meaning that including them in regressions could distort the 
results. Allowing poor-, middle- and high-income countries to have their own intercepts, 
results in a slightly more negative coefficient on openness, with a p-value of 0.058. By use of 
a pooled 2SLS-estimator, we find that openness is usually statistically insignificant, but one 
combination of instrumental variables results in a negative coefficient that is relatively robust 
on a ten percent significance level. The instrumental variables work well, and are both 
relevant and seemingly exogenous. 
5.4.5 Fixed effect 2SLS-regression 
There is a possibility that the regression is affected by country-specific fixed effects, inducing 
biased estimates. We therefore move on to the fixed effect 2SLS-estimator, to see whether the 
results differ. When the FE 2SLS-regression is run, Stata include an F-test reporting whether 
or not country-specific fixed effects are statistically different from zero. This is indeed the 
case, as the null is rejected with a p-value of 0.00. Even though we do not know for certain 
                                                 
26 Robustness tests were also performed on regression (8), but the coefficient on openness remained statistically 
insignificant through all tests. The instrumental variables remained valid. 
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the estimate is biased in the pooled 2SLS-model, this test leads us to conclude that a panel 
data-estimator is a better way to progress than the pooled model. The random effect 2SLS-
estimator yields very similar results as the fixed effect 2SLS-estimator, except for the variable 
of main interest to our analysis. In the RE 2SLS-model, the estimate on openness is -0.06, 
while the corresponding estimate from the FE-estimator is almost five times as large in 
absolute terms. Consequently, we proceed with an IV-approach using a fixed effect-estimator. 
When the residuals from the FE 2SLS regression with the main specification is tested for unit-
root, we are left with 89 countries. The errors show signs of heteroskedasticity, but the 
Wooldridge test for serial correlation cannot reject the null of no serial correlation, with a p-
value of 0.31. We proceed while applying heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
In table 4, the output from the first stage regressions with the different instrumental variables 
is presented, latitude excluded since it is time-invariant. Both years as member of 
GATT/WTO (1 and 2) and voting alignment with the U.S. (4) is statistically significant in 
predicting openness, and the Stock & Yogo-test reject that they are weak instruments. The 
endogeneity tests also indicate that there is endogeneity in the FE-model, and consequently 
that an IV-specification is preferable. Share of children immune to DPT (3), however, has 
little explanatory power as country-specific fixed effects are removed, and it does not pass the 
Stock & Yogo-test. This indicates that the pooled 2SLS-model where this variable is included 
might be biased. Even though the overidentification test accepts the regressions where share 
of children immune to DPT is paired with the other instrumental variables (5 and 6), we leave 
it out of the further analyses as a precaution to avoid the possible weak instrument bias. We 
move forward with years of membership in GATT/WTO and voting alignment with the U.S 
as the preferred instrumental variables. The KP-statistic for this specification exceeds both the 
threshold for relative bias to OLS and the threshold for size distortion, indicating that the 
openness coefficient can be trusted. The reduced form, first stage regression equation is: 
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡̂ = 𝛿1𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑊𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑊𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛿3 ln(𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑈𝑆𝐴)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (20) 
Where 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the random error term, 𝐶𝑖𝑡 is a vector of control variables the country-individual 
mean is removed from all variables, including omitted fixed effects. Equation (21) is the 
second-stage regression equation: 
∆ 𝑌𝑖𝑡 −∆ 𝑌𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =  𝛽1(𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡̂ − 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡̂
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) + 𝜃2 (𝐶𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶?̅?) + (𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝑒?̅?) (21) 
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The coefficient on openness when share of children immune to DPT is included alone (3), 
gives a strong indication that our decision to leave it out of the main specification (7) was 
probably correct. The two other instruments yield similar estimates when they are included 
alone, together and in different forms, while the immunization measure gives a much larger 
but insignificant result. In the regression with our main specification, the coefficient indicates 
that a one-unit increase in the openness index corresponds with a 0.28 percentage point 
decrease in annual growth. This result is statistically significant within a five percent 
significance level. This is a large effect, and contrary to theory and most previous research. 
5.4.6 Robustness of the results 
We want to test the robustness of this finding in several ways, and start out by looking at the 
relationship between the openness coefficient and other variables (table 4.1). We run one 
regression for each additional control variable, while the main control variables are included 
in all regressions. We find that the coefficient is relatively stable when the different control 
variables are included, and the instrumental variables remain strong and valid. Contrary to the 
pooled 2SLS-model, the coefficient remains statistically significant when both price level (1) 
and the left oriented government-variable (5) is included. It is only significant on a ten percent 
significance level when trade as share of GDP is included (2), but except for this, the 
coefficient remains significant on a five percent significance level, and with a magnitude 
between -0.32 and -0.26. The most encouraging regression is when human capital and labour 
in squared term are added to the main specification (8). This results in a coefficient on 
openness at -0.345, significant on a one percent significance level. Altering the regression 
specification result in coefficients   
We would also like to see if altering the sample has any effects. The countries are divided into 
three groups after income level, whereby we run one regression on each sample group (table 
4.2). The regression including the high-income group shows a coefficient that is more 
negative and significant on a one percent significance level. The coefficients on low and 
middle-income countries are statistically insignificant. However, we see that most of the 
coefficients on the control variables are also not significant, which may indicate that there is 
not sufficient variation within the income groups. It could also be that rich countries, that has 
high levels of openness on average, have little to gain by more liberalization, and that this 
effect drives the results. If correct, this is similar to the findings of Dreher (2006), who found 
that interaction terms between openness and income levels were only statistically different 
from zero in the case for high-income countries. In his case, however, this coefficient was 
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positive, and the openness index was directly included in the regressions. When different 
control variables are included for the regression on high-income countries (table 4.3), we find 
that the coefficient remains statistically significant on a five percent significance level, and 
with a magnitude between -0.337 and -0.377. One exception is when share of trade to GDP is 
included (5), where openness is only significant on a ten percent significance level, and it falls 
to -0.22. We find that changes in price level is no longer significant (1), possibly indicating 
that high-income countries have less macroeconomic instability. 
The FE 2SLS-regressions gives a clear indication that there exists some negative relationship 
between openness and economic growth, and that this effect might be large. The standard 
deviation of openness in a given year is roughly 0.2, corresponding with a 5.6 percentage 
points lower annual growth. Still, most countries would seldom increase much more than 0.02 
in a given year, which would correspond with a decreased growth of 0.56 percentage points.  
An additional strength of the FE 2SLS-model in our case is that it is the only specification 
where cross-sectional dependence is rejected (see appendix 4, table 5). This allows us to 
further trust the already robust findings. We conclude that the instruments show great 
strength. Additionally, the overidentification tests indicate that they are valid within several 
regression specifications. 
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Part 5 
6 Discussion 
There is much debate on the topic of liberalization of trade policy and the possible 
connections to wealth, and even though many economists agree that free trade and openness is 
for the good, other researchers point out that robust relationships are hard to come by. This 
has definitely been the case for our research as well. We have conducted a wide array of 
different tests and regressions, included and excluded a variety of variables, used both pooled 
and FE-models, and with openness included directly and through instrument variables. Some 
regressions were inconclusive, with statistically insignificant coefficients on openness, but 
there were several results that were significantly different from zero. Contrary to expectations, 
most of them were negative, and especially the coefficients in the fixed effect IV-regression 
showed a strong negative relationship between openness and economic growth. 
How can it be, that the only significant and robust result we find is contrary to economic 
theory, a theory with very few opponents in the world of economics? If we ignore the obvious 
possibility of omitted variable bias, there are a couple of potential reasons. As previously 
discussed, it has been argued that countries with poor institutions and corruption problems 
have little to gain by liberalising their trade policy, or that openness and free trade may 
actually be directly harmful to such countries (Rodriguez & Rodrik, 2000; Wei, 2000; 
Yanikkaya, 2003). Other countries, with sound institutions and well developed democracy, 
may experience large gains related to openness. It is possible that several countries have 
experienced significant negative effects from attempts of opening up, and that these effects 
dominate the positive effects of other countries with stronger institutions. We have run 
regressions where indicators of democracy are included, but the coefficient on openness has 
not been significantly altered.  
Also, we find that richer countries, which presumably on average have the best institutions, 
have the largest negative coefficient. Krugman, Melitz, & Obstfeld (2012, p. 283) proved that 
the optimum tariff is larger than zero, and it may be that the optimum level of general 
openness to trade is not complete free trade. Adding to the direct “supply and demand”-effects 
that they calculate, there could be other, more complex effects. Many countries’ tax systems 
are progressive, and most of the benefits are distributed to the less wealthy parts of the 
population. Possibly, poorer individuals have a larger propensity to consume, and if the 
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distortions from the barriers to trade are sufficiently small, the extra consumption could 
induce a net positive effect. It is also possible that the result is driven mainly by the fact that 
high-income countries already find themselves on high levels of openness. 
Frankel & Romer (1999) finds a link between trade and economic growth, where trade is 
predicted via a gravity model. As previously noted, trade policy is part of the residual in their 
paper. It we assume that the positive impact of trade on growth, our finding is somewhat 
puzzling. If the findings in both the article of Frankel & Romer and our thesis are true, one 
must conclude that trade policy does not significantly affect the level of trade. Otherwise, it 
could be that the variables included in the gravity model simply are not exogenous, and that 
they themselves are beneficial to economic growth. If so, the positive effect of trade on 
economic growth, found by Frankel & Romer, is simply a spurious result. 
In the research of Dollar (1992) and Sachs & Warner (1995), they employed different proxies 
for trade policy, and found significant positive effect of policies open to international trade. If 
our result is correct, it is a clear support of Rodriguez & Rodrik (2000) and their claim that the 
indices of Dollar and SW actually capture the effect of macroeconomic instability and poor 
institutions. Contrary to those indicators, this thesis employs an index that is a rather direct 
measure of trade policy, and this might be the best way to capture policy’s effect on economic 
growth. 
6.1.1 If openness is harmful, why would it persist? 
There are many reasons why a country would keep open after it has liberalised its trade 
policy, even if one assumes the costs to outweigh the gains. An obvious reason is that laws 
and policies takes time to reverse within a country, and multilateral agreements could also ban 
a country from reversing such policies. When a policy is made active it will most likely 
continue at least through the current governments reign, and politicians may be aware that 
frequent policy changes create instability and uncertainty that is usually considered bad for 
business. This is associated with the fact that shifts in trade policy forces structural changes in 
the economy that are costly to reverse, acting as an incentive for new governments to continue 
on the same path as governments before them. International credibility also plays a role in a 
country´s sustainability of its current level of openness. Even if current trade policies are not 
optimal for a specific country, the costs of increased protectionism might be much larger if 
other countries decides to impose some sort of “punishment”. 
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6.1.2 Important caveats 
There could be important, time-variant effects that correlate with both GDP-growth and level 
of openness, and that are omitted from the model. If so, they will lead to bias in the estimated 
beta-coefficients. The 2SLS-estimator accounts for this bias if the instruments are truly 
exogenous, but the overidentification test and our reasoning might be incorrect or in some 
way incomplete. It possibly exists a direct connection between the instrument variables and 
economic growth, that is not time-invariant, rendering them endogenous. Most of our results 
either indicate a negative relationship or no relationship at all. If most omitted variables 
correlate in the same direction with both openness and growth, something we assume that is 
the case, including them in the model would actually lead to a more negative coefficient.  
Related to the problem of omitted variable bias is the fact that it might not exist a single, 
direct relationship between openness and growth, but that certain preconditions are required. 
This is properly discussed in the section for earlier research, and is important to keep in mind. 
It might also be the case that international trade openness has network effects. If every 
individual had its own, private Facebook not connected to everyone else’s, it is doubtful if so 
many people would enjoy it very much. Similarly, countries that liberalize their trade policy 
might see little benefits if other countries remained at a constant level. However, as the world 
has become a more open market, it should be possible to find increasing growth-effects of 
liberalization in the later years if this was indeed correct, effects that we could not identify. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, our aim was to find whether or not openness to trade 
had an effect on the welfare in a country. We define GDP per capita as an adequate proxy 
variable for welfare, and it is the dependent variable in our structural model. Several 
problematic issues were mentioned, and we would like to single out two of them here. Firstly, 
the distribution of income is not captured in the GDP-figures, making an empirical analysis 
less covering. Also, people’s wellbeing is not perfectly captured by GDP, even though there is 
a correlation between the two. If trade barriers make foreign goods very expensive, or even 
unobtainable, people may buy the domestic counterparts of those products. The price might be 
the same or higher, but the consumer is possibly less happy than he could have been with the 
foreign option. The use of GDP per capita as a welfare measure thus affect the conclusions 
ambiguously. 
  
45 
 
7 Conclusion 
The objective of this thesis is to answer the following research question: 
“To which degree, if any, does openness to international trade lead to increased economic 
growth within a country?” 
To find an answer, we employ data from several sources in different regressions, testing for 
various statistical issues that may distort the answers, and thus prevent any conclusions on the 
existence of a causal relationship. We conclude that endogeneity is a problem, and that 
omitted, country-specific fixed effects are present and potentially causing spurious results. 
Consequently, we employ instrumental variables, where the main focus of the analysis is a 
fixed effect-regression where two instrumental variables are used to predict the level of 
openness within each country at any point in time.  
The theoretical foundation for the relationship between trade and growth build on the classical 
work of David Ricardo, and is later augmented by other researchers, but this thesis is strictly 
empirical, and does not directly apply any of the theory other than as a baseline for discussion 
and understanding. We initially had no strong beliefs regarding the results, but some sort of 
positive relationship was expected, as indicated by most of the literature. However, the results 
surprised us, and we are not able to locate any robust, positive relationship. The world has 
seen high growth in periods of openness, and low growth in periods of protectionism, but the 
econometric results still leave us with a negative estimated effect of openness on growth. 
Applying different estimators yield different results, but common for all of them is that 
neither result in robust coefficients that are significantly larger than zero.  
Our main specification is a fixed effect 2SLS-regression with years as GATT/WTO-member 
and voting-similarity with the U.S. as instrumental variables for openness. Tests indicate that 
they are both strong and exogenous. The negative coefficient on openness in this regression 
holds when controlling for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, and also when performing 
several robustness tests. These tests include adding and removing different control variables, 
an overidentification test of the instruments and modification of the sample, and we find that 
the result is not sensitive to any of these variations.  
We draw two main conclusions from the results in this thesis. Firstly, we have found that 
performing econometric analyses to macroeconomic data in general, and policy variables in 
particular, implies large uncertainties, no matter which methods are applied. There are 
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important variables that are either omitted or can be assumed endogenous if included, cultural 
and institutional differences relevant examples. Many such effects are likely removed by a 
fixed effect estimator, but not all. That is also the reason why we choose to apply instrumental 
variables, to account for endogeneity. However, any conclusion is weakened by the fact that 
testing for endogeneity is only possible to a limited extent. 
Related to policy, the negative connection between growth and openness to trade indicates 
that forcing countries into liberalisation is not generally a good solution. Convincing theories 
have evolved over time, and most research find that free trade is economically beneficial, 
findings that this thesis cannot falsify. In fact, we believe that a world where countries trade 
and barriers are limited, can contribute positively to increased wealth. However, opening up 
to trade can be directly harmful if not properly conducted, with very real consequences to the 
people involved. The fact that we identified several robust, negative coefficients, and no 
robust positive coefficients, might mean that barriers to trade can be positive for an individual 
country, all else equal. The conclusion of this thesis is consequently that openness to 
international trade does not automatically lead to increased economic growth. 
7.1 Further research 
The scenario that openness to trade is beneficial for all, conditional on everyone following the 
same policy, is a plausible one. If there indeed exists a negative ceteris paribus relationship 
between openness and growth, the situation takes form of a classical prisoners’ dilemma, 
where each individual has an incentive to deviate from the common best solution, that is free 
trade. Hypothetically this is meaningful, but future research could try to prove that it is the 
case, by analysing whether for example negotiation rounds in GATT or WTO caused large, 
immediate shifts in mean tariff rates. Such shocks could potentially cause increased trade, and 
if Frankel and Romer are correct, increased growth. 
Several policy variables are available, and one possibility is finding a variable that has a 
cointegrating relationship with GDP in level form. If such a relationship exists, one could 
build a vector error correction model, separating the long-run relationship between trade 
openness and economic growth from the short-run relationship. Such a framework could 
possibly better explain which way the causality goes. Alternatively, instead of finding a 
different measure of policy, one could try to find other measures of welfare that cointegrated 
with the openness indicator applied in this thesis. This has an additional advantage, since 
there may exist better measures of welfare than GDP. Indices measuring happiness and 
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quality of life will surely improve in the coming years, and as data becomes more abundant, 
more robust econometric analyses are made possible. This may be the best way to go forward 
in order to find the policy that works best for as many people as possible. 
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9 Attachments 
9.1 Appendix 1 – Data information 
 
 
        1   Angola        50  United Kingdom        99   Nigeria
        2   Albania        51  Georgia       100  Netherlands
        3   Argentina        52  Ghana       101  Norway
        4   Armenia        53  Guinea       102  Nepal
        5   Australia        54  Gambia       103  New Zealand
        6   Austria        55  Guinea-Bissau       104  Oman
        7   Azerbaijan        56  Greece       105  Pakistan
        8   Burundi        57  Guatemala       106  Panama
        9   Belgium        58  Honduras       107  Peru
       10  Benin        59  Croatia       108  Philippines
       11  Burkina Faso        60  Hungary       109  Poland
       12  Bangladesh        61  Indonesia       110  Portugal
       13  Bulgaria        62  India       111  Paraguay
       14  Bahrain        63  Ireland       112  Qatar
       15  Bahamas        64  Iran (Islamic Republic of)       113  Romania
       16  Bosnia and Herzegovina        65  Iceland       114  Russian Federation
       17  Belarus        66  Israel       115  Rwanda
       18  Belize        67  Italy       116  Saudi Arabia
       19  Bolivia        68  Jamaica       117  Senegal
       20  Brazil        69  Jordan       118  Singapore
       21  Barbados        70  Japan       119  Sierra Leone
       22  Brunei Darussalam        71  Kazakhstan       120  El Salvador
       23  Botswana        72  Kenya       121  Serbia
       24  Central African Republic        73  Kyrgyzstan       122  Sao Tome and Principe
       25  Canada        74  Cambodia       123  Suriname
       26  Switzerland        75  Saint Kitts and Nevis       124  Slovakia
       27  Chile        76  Republic of Korea       125  Slovenia
       28  China, People's Republic of        77  Kuwait       126  Sweden
       29  Côte d'Ivoire        78  Lao People's Democratic Republic       127  Swaziland
       30  Cameroon        79  Lebanon       128  Syrian Arab Republic
       31  Democratic Republic of the Congo        80  Liberia       129  Chad
       32  Congo        81  Lesotho       130  Togo
       33  Colombia        82  Luxembourg       131  Thailand
       34  Cape Verde        83  Morocco       132  Turkmenistan
       35  Costa Rica        84  Republic of Moldova       133  Trinidad and Tobago
       36  Cyprus        85  Madagascar       134  Tunisia
       37  Czech Republic        86  Maldives       135  Turkey
       38  Germany        87  Mexico       136  Taiwan
       39  Denmark        88  The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia       137  United Republic of Tanzania: Mainland
       40  Dominican Republic        89  Mali       138  Ukraine
       41  Ecuador        90  Montenegro       139  Uruguay
       42  Egypt        91  Mongolia       140  United States
       43  Spain        92  Mozambique       141  Venezuela
       44  Estonia        93  Mauritania       142  Viet Nam
       45  Ethiopia        94  Mauritius       143  Yemen
       46  Finland        95  Malawi       144  South Africa
       47  Fiji        96  Malaysia       145  Zambia
       48  France        97  Namibia       146  Zimbabwe
       49  Gabon        98  Niger
Country list
Table 1
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Variable Name in regressions Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Description Source
Economic Growth Δ(GDP/cap) 5,587 0.0193314 0.088442 -0.9218097 1.012582 Expenditure-side real GDP per capita at chained PPPs (in mil. 2005US$) Penn World Table
Openness to trade Openness 5,509 0.4977908 0.2305108 0.0426301 0.9826156 Measure of countries' level of trade-openness (see detailed decription in table 3) KOF globalisation index
Social Globalization Social Globalization 5,650 40.99243 21.88831 5.222476 93.53602 Measuring  countries level of social globalization KOF globalisation index
Political Globalization Political Globalization 5,650 56.75712 22.50375 3.991329 98.15632 Measuring a countries level of political globalization KOF globalisation index
Change in Capital Δln(Capital) 5,587 0.0522499 0.0605513 -0.487587 0.9719934 Capital stock at current PPPs (in mil. 2005US$) Penn World Table
Change in persons engaged Δln(Labor) 5,264 0.0212295 0.0291351 -0.2396488 0.291219 Number of persons engaged (in millions) Penn World Table
Change in population Δln(Population) 5,587 0.0174327 0.0150065 -0.199246 0.1858832 Population (in millions) Penn World Table
Life Expectancy Life expectancy 6,025 64.59694 11.00081 19.50493 82.93146 Measured as life expectancy at birth World Bank
Human Capital Human Capital 4,949 2.209653 0.6076951 1.039863 3.618748 Index of human capital per worker based on the average years of schooling Penn World Table
Initial Wealth ln(Initial wealth) 5,292 8.129418 1.087524 6.113977 11.29507
Initial wealth in 1970 using expenditure-side Real GDP per capita at chained PPPs (in 
mil. 2005US$) Penn World Table
Change in price level Δ(Price level) 5,587 0.0159909 0.0611676 -0.7559226 0.7022061
Price level of Real consumption of households and government PPP-adjusted, 
divided by the nominal exchange rate measured in price level of USA GDP in 2005=1 Penn World Table
                                                
Change in exchange rate Δ(Exchange rate) 5,587 19.97845 186.7822 -2158.472 7104.243 Exchange rate, national currency/USD (market+estimated) Penn World Table
                                                
Government Expenditure Government Exp. 3,999 6.528984 20.68545 -83.568 649.151 General government total expenditure 
Quality of Government 
(Variable name: imf_exp)
Tradeshare Trade share 5,113 76.63037 47.53917 5.314175 562.0604 (Export+Import)/Real GDP Penn World Table
Variable descriptions
Table 2
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Freedom House Index Democracy 4,938 5.747983 3.376763 0 10 Freedom House Index ranging from 0 (Least democratized) to 10 (Fully democratized) Freedom House
Polity Index Polity-index 5,173 1.699981 7.409526 -10 10 Polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic)
Quality of Government 
(Variable name: p_polity2)
Change in Oil Price Δ(Oil price) 5,986 1.821596 11.18125 -28.28465 37.47994 World Oil price measured in Constant price of oil in 2000 (dollar/brl)
Quality of Government 
(Variable name: 
ross_oil_price)
Left-Oriented Government Left government 6,132 0.2429876 0.4289226 0 1
Dummy variable taking the number 1 if Chief executiv party orientation orientation is 
left and 0 if otherwise
Quality of Government 
(Variable name: dpi_erlc)
Fertility Fertility 5,436 3.829807 2.019125 1.076 8.667 Fertility rate, total (births per woman)
Quality of Government 
(Variable name: wdi_fertility
Dummy for years after 1990 After 1990 6,132 0.5 0.5000408 0 1 Dummy variable taking the value 1 after 1990 and zero otherwise
Voting in line with United 
States
Voting in line with 
United States 5,467 .2488545 .1624598 0 1 Share of votes in line with U.S.  in UN General Assembly (% pr. Year) Erik Voeten
Distance from equator Latitude 6,088 .2952706 .189995 0 .7222222 Absolute latitude 
Quality of Government 
(Variable name: lp_lat_abst)
Percentage of Children 
Immune to DPT Immunization DPT 4,306 75.23154 26.55726 0 99 Percentage of children immune to DPT
Quality of Government 
(Variable name: 
wdi_immdpt)
Years with GATT/WTO 
membership Years in Gatt/WTO 6,132 17.26486 18.48107 0 63 Years since joining WTO/GATT WTO Homepage
High income country Highincome 6,132 0.3424658 0.4745732 0 1
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if defined as high income country by The World 
Bank and zero if otherwise World Bank
Middle income country Middleincome 6,132 0.5 0.5000408 0 1
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if defined as middle income country by The World 
Bank and zero if otherwise World Bank
Low income country Lowincome 6,132 0.1575342 0.3643334 0 1
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if defined as low income country by The World 
Bank and zero if otherwise World Bank
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Table 3 - Description of the components of openness indicator 
Source: Dreher (2006) 
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9.1.1 Sources for data 
 Penn World Table: (Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, 2015) 
 Quality of Government: (Teorell, et al., 2015) 
o Ross_Oil_Price: (Ross, 2013) 
o Wdi_fertility and Wdi_immdpt: (United Nations Statistics, 2014) 
o Dpi_erlc: (Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, & Walsh, 2001) 
o P_polity2: (Freedom House, 2014) 
 The KOF Globalisation index: (Dreher, 2006),  
o Available at: http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/ 
 Erik Voeten: (Voeten, Strezhnev, & Bailey, 2009) 
 Freedom House: (Freedom House, 2015) 
 The World Bank: (The World Bank, 2015)
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9.2 Appendix 2 – Unit-root test 
Below, results from the unit-root tests are presented. The reported p-values in the table is from 
testing the null hypothesis that all panels are non-stationary. The test is a Fisher-type Phillips-
Perron unit-root test for panel data, based on Phillips & Perron (1988). For the variables on 
level form, a linear trend is included, while the tests on the differenced variables is run 
without a linear trend. All tests are run with one lag.  
 LEVEL FORM FIRST DIFFERENCED 
GDP PER CAPITA 1.00 0.00 
OPENNESS 1.00 0.00 
CAPITAL 1.00 0.00 
LABOUR 1.00 0.00 
POPULATION 0.00 0.00 
LIFE EXPECTANCY 0.00 - 
HUMAN CAPITAL 0.00 - 
PRICE LEVEL 1.00 0.00 
DEMOCRACY 0.00 - 
POLITY INDEX 0.00 - 
TRADE SHARE 0.00 - 
EXCHANGE RATE 0.02 0.00 
FERTILITY 0.00 - 
SOCIAL GLOBALISATION 1.00 0.00 
POLITICAL GLOBALISATION 0.00 - 
OIL PRICE 1.00 0.00 
62 
 
9.3 Appendix 3 – Regression results 
 
 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap)
Openness 0.0204*** 0.00843 0.0108* 0.00871 0.000244 -0.00619 -0.00529 -0.00131
(0.00703) (0.00701) (0.00642) (0.00622) (0.00560) (0.00496) (0.00490) (0.00548)
Δln(Capital) 0.345*** 0.351*** 0.365*** 0.358*** 0.356*** 0.343***
(0.0695) (0.0718) (0.0762) (0.0751) (0.0759) (0.0790)
Δln(Labour) -0.109 0.109* 0.0892 0.0898 0.0921
(0.0864) (0.0604) (0.0604) (0.0602) (0.0623)
Δln(Population) -0.693*** -0.599*** -0.619*** -0.532**
(0.166) (0.184) (0.189) (0.215)
Life expectancy 0.000502*** 0.000587*** 0.000834***
(0.000160) (0.000198) (0.000260)
Human capital -0.00266 0.00122
(0.00334) (0.00423)
ln(Initial wealth) -0.00523*
(0.00272)
Constant 0.00946** 0.0362** 0.0113 0.0150 0.0261 -0.0112 -0.0113 0.00757
(0.00401) (0.0145) (0.0156) (0.0162) (0.0170) (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0114)
Observations 3416 3416 3416 3416 3416 3416 3416 3416
R-squared 0.003 0.071 0.124 0.125 0.134 0.138 0.138 0.140
Adjusted R-squared 0.003 0.060 0.113 0.114 0.123 0.126 0.126 0.128
F-value 8.379 7.721 9.729 9.225 9.183 15.42 15.91 19.01
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01
Regression 2-7 are controlled for year-specific effects
Table 1
Ordinary Least Squares - OLS
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap)
Openness 0.00235 0.00122 0.0155* -0.00192 -0.000589 -0.00253 -0.00131
(0.00575) (0.00601) (0.00930) (0.00567) (0.00664) (0.00620) (0.00548)
Additional controls
Δ(Price level) -0.278**
(0.108)
Government Exp. 0.000824*
(0.000480)
Social Globalization -0.000235**
(0.0000894)
Political Globalization 0.0000356
(0.0000484)
Trade share -0.00000216
(0.0000235)
Democracy 0.000109
(0.000408)
Δ(Oil price) 0.000713***
(0.000214)
Main controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3416 2576 3416 3416 3178 3106 3416
R-Squared 0.179 0.198 0.141 0.140 0.134 0.142 0.140
Adj. R-Squared 0.168 0.185 0.129 0.128 0.121 0.128 0.128
F-Value 19.88 13.31 17.90 19.29 15.00 21.68 19.01
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01
All regressions are controlled for year-specific effects
Table 1.1
Ordinary Least Squares - Additional Controls
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap)
Openness 0.0796*** 0.0298 0.0252 0.0253 0.0243 0.0203 0.0240
(0.0177) (0.0281) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0208) (0.0201)
Δln(Capital) 0.343*** 0.344*** 0.350*** 0.335*** 0.335***
(0.0815) (0.0824) (0.0865) (0.0878) (0.0876)
Δln(Labour) -0.0166 0.0898 0.0954 0.101
(0.102) (0.0663) (0.0640) (0.0639)
Δln(Population) -0.534 -0.647** -0.686**
(0.348) (0.301) (0.307)
Life expectancy 0.00162** 0.00163**
(0.000636) (0.000624)
Human capital -0.0274**
(0.0124)
Observations 3334 3334 3334 3334 3334 3334 3334
R-Squared 0.010 0.074 0.118 0.118 0.121 0.125 0.126
Adj. R-Squared 0.009 0.062 0.107 0.107 0.109 0.113 0.114
F-Value 20.19 7.672 9.230 9.203 9.649 10.74 10.23
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01
All regressions are controlled for year-specific effects
Fixed effect regression
Table 2
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap)
Openness 0.0284 0.0167 0.0349* 0.0238 0.0344 0.0339 0.0240
(0.0199) (0.0220) (0.0208) (0.0200) (0.0222) (0.0220) (0.0201)
Additional Controls
Δ(Price level) -0.280**
(0.112)
Government Exp. 0.000807
(0.000500)
Social Globalization -0.000549*
(0.000289)
Political Globalization 0.000228
(0.000201)
Trade share -0.000186*
(0.000109)
Democracy -0.0000914
(0.000937)
Δ(Oil price) -0.00519***
(0.00105)
Main controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3334 2512 3334 3334 3111 3031 3334
R-Squared 0.166 0.182 0.127 0.127 0.120 0.128 0.126
Adj. R-Squared 0.154 0.170 0.115 0.114 0.107 0.114 0.114
F-Value 10.12 9.192 10.61 10.03 9.222 8.186 10.23
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01
All regressions are controlled for year-specific effects
Table 2.1
Fixed effect regression - Additional Controls
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Second stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap)
Openness 0.00939 -0.0481 -0.00762 -3.942 -0.0561 -0.00362 -0.0566* -0.0117
(0.0264) (0.0367) (0.0181) (43.51) (0.0711) (0.0248) (0.0327) (0.0173)
First stage
Latitude 0.415*** 0.376*** 0.256***
(0.0240) (0.0246) (0.0265)
Ln(Voting in line with United States) 0.0948*** 0.0639*** 0.100*** 0.074***
(0.00814) (0.00818) (0.00847) (0.009)
Ln(Immunization DPT) 0.177*** 0.158***
(0.0142) (0.0123)
Years as GATT/WTO-member -0.0000204 -0.00283*** -0.00315*** -0.0016**
(0.000227) (0.000597) (0.000589) (0.0006)
(Years as GATT/WTO-member)^2 0.0000585*** 0.0000495*** 0.00003**
(0.0000109) (0.0000107) (0.000011)
Main controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3182 3182 2526 3182 3182 3182 3182 2526
Overidentification Test - - - - - 0.113 0.761 0.218
F-value excluded instruments 300.8 135.6 154.6 0.00814 14.67 176.3 60.26 113.8
Test for endogeneity 0.547 0.224 0.893 0.455 0.502 0.988 0.0975 0.765
F-value second stage 9.038 8.975 8.676 0.102 8.767 8.987 8.831 8.552
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01
All regressions are controlled for year-specific effects
Table 3
Two-Stage Least Squares - Pooled 2SLS
First-stage for Openness:
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap)
Openness -0.0347 -0.0613* -0.0574* -0.0664** -0.0498 -0.0704* -0.0566*
(0.0329) (0.0346) (0.0328) (0.0333) (0.0313) (0.0392) (0.0327)
Additional controls
Δ(Price level) -0.234***
(0.0698)
Trade share -0.00000619
(0.0000421)
Δ(Exchange rate) 0.0000203
(0.0000146)
Polity-index 0.0000777
(0.000342)
Left government 0.00594*
(0.00323)
Fertility -0.00466
(0.00287)
After 1990 0.0183
(0.0112)
Main controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Overidentification Test 0.665 0.871 0.701 0.807 0.731 0.915 0.761
Observations 3182 2977 3182 3020 3182 3116 3182
F-value excluded instruments 58.46 59.05 60.21 51.27 67.08 50.41 60.26
Test for endogeneity 0.291 0.0783 0.0933 0.0768 0.138 0.108 0.0975
F-value second stage 9.079 8.051 8.586 8.807 8.738 8.479 8.785
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01
All regressions are controlled for year-specific effects
Table 3.1
2SLS - Additional controls
68 
 
 
Second stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap)
Openness -0.293* -0.251** 0.245 -0.384 -0.377** -0.412 -0.283**
(0.150) (0.128) (0.853) (0.239) (0.179) (0.274) (0.118)
First stage
Years in Gatt/WTO  0.002977*** 0.0015831*** 0.00362*** 0.00167***
(0.0003564) (0.0005492) (0.0008) (0.000548)
(Years in Gatt/WTO)^2 0.0000193*** 0.0000068 0.000018***
(0.000006) (0.000007) (0.000006)
ln(Immunization DPT) -0.0055* -0.008935*** -0.00313
( 0.0032539) (0.00327) (0.003246)
ln(Voting in line with United States) 0.022431*** 0.022593*** 0.022063***
(0.004797) (0.00542) (0.004816)
Main controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3117 3117 2531 3117 2531 2531 3117
Overidentification Test 0.749 0.447 0.591
F-value excluded instruments 69.79 38.68 2.857 21.86 19.43 9.671 36.48
Test for endogeneity 0.0326 0.0457 0.777 0.0821 0.0189 0.126 0.0130
F-value second stage 7.162 7.254 7.975 6.697 7.287 7.056 7.096
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01
All regressions are controlled for year-specific effects
First stage on Openness:
Table 4
Fixed Effects Two-Stage Least Squares - FE 2SLS
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap)
Openness -0.0347 -0.0613* -0.0574* -0.0664** -0.0498 -0.0704* -0.0566* -0.345***
(0.0329) (0.0346) (0.0328) (0.0333) (0.0313) (0.0392) (0.0327) (0.131)
Additional controls
Δ(Price level) -0.234***
(0.0698)
Trade share -0.00000619
(0.0000421)
Δ(Exchange rate) 0.0000203
(0.0000146)
Polity-index 0.0000777
(0.000342)
Left government 0.00594*
(0.00323)
Fertility -0.00466
(0.00287)
After 1990 0.0183
(0.0112)
Δln(Labour)^2 -1.448*
(0.852)
(Human capital)^2 0.0177**
(0.00822)
Main controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Overidentification Test 0.665 0.871 0.701 0.807 0.731 0.915 0.761 0.391
Observations 3182 2977 3182 3020 3182 3116 3182 3117
F-value excluded instruments 58.46 59.05 60.21 51.27 67.08 50.41 60.26 32.27
Test for endogeneity 0.291 0.0783 0.0933 0.0768 0.138 0.108 0.0975 0.0083
F-value second stage 9.079 8.051 8.586 8.807 8.738 8.479 8.785 6.633
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01
All regressions are controlled for year-specific effects
TSLS - Additional controls
Table 4.1
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High income Middle income Low income
Dependent variable Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap)
Openness -0.356*** -0.0371 -0.273
(0.128) (0.141) (0.208)
Δln(Capital) 0.554*** 0.394*** 0.122
(0.0740) (0.0358) (0.128)
Δln(Labor) 0.241 0.0656 -0.00915
(0.205) (0.0840) (0.144)
Δln(Population) -1.552* 0.353 0.808
(0.827) (0.751) (0.765)
Life expectancy -0.00358 0.000908 0.00111
(0.00329) (0.000822) (0.00104)
Human Capital 0.0629* -0.0338 -0.0249
(0.0341) (0.0240) (0.0691)
Observations 930 1713 474
Overidentification Test 0.878 0.0507 0.633
F-value excluded instruments 39.53 12.60 17.38
Test for endogeneity 0.00341 0.969 0.0676
F-value second stage 5.620 7.360 2.155
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01
All regressions are controlled for year-specific-effects
Tabell 4.2
Fixed Effects Two-Stage Least Squares - Income groups
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap) Δ(GDP/cap)
Openness -0.337*** -0.356*** -0.377** -0.361** -0.220* -0.356***
(0.129) (0.129) (0.163) (0.155) (0.131) (0.128)
Additional controls
Δ(Price level) -0.137
(0.0962)
Δ(Exchange rate) -0.0000366
(0.0000758)
Democracy 0.00525**
(0.00266)
Polity-index 0.00139
(0.000910)
Trade share -0.000145
(0.000109)
After 1990 0.0671**
(0.0276)
Main controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 930 930 801 817 890 930
Overidentification Test 0.930 0.874 0.900 0.991 0.741 0.878
F-value excluded instruments 38.61 39.39 36.88 33.94 38.03 39.53
Test for endogeneity 0.00684 0.00343 0.0127 0.00988 0.0704 0.00341
F-value second stage 5.595 5.533 5.710 5.495 5.588 5.620
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01
All regressions are controlled for year-specific effects
Table 4.3
Fixed Effects Two-Stage Least Squares - High income group
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Estimator Ordinary Least Squares Fixed Effects 2SLS Fixed effects - 2SLS
Tests
Test for heteroskedasticity* Breuch-Pagan: p-val (0.0068) Modified Wald test: p-val ( 0.000) Analog of Breusch-Pagan: p-val (0.000) Analog of Breusch-Pagan: p-val (0.000)
Test for Serial correlation** Wolldridge test: p-val (0.0630) Wolldridge test: p-val (0.0646) Wooldridge test: p-val (0.3342)  Wooldridge test: p-val (0.3077)
Test for Cross-Sectional dependency*** Pesaran: p-val (0.0000) Pesaran: p-val (0.0000) Pesaran: p-val (0.0004) Pesaran: p-val (0.1568)
Test for unit root in residuals**** Augmented DF: p-val (0.000) Augmented DF: p-val (0.000) Augmented DF: p-val (0.000) Augmented DF: p-val (0.000)
Phillips-Perron: p-val (0.000) Phillips-Perron: p-val (0.000) Phillips-Perron: p-val (0.000) Phillips-Perron: p-val (0.000)
*Null hypothesis for all tests of heteroskedasticity is that errors are homoskedatic
**Null hypothesis Wooldridge test of serial correlation is that errors exhibits no autocorrelation
***Null hypothesis for Pesaran test of cross-sectional dependency is that the pairwise errors do not exhibit cross-section dependency
****Null hypothesis for both tests of unit root in panels is that at least 1 panel is stationary (Each individual country`s residual is also tested)
Testing various statistical problems 
Table 5
